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A/B, 4, 3/48

12 February 1951

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR  
SUBJECT: Special Interrogations

1. In our conversation of 9 February 1951, I outlined to you the possibilities of augmenting the usual interrogation methods by the use of drugs, hypnosis, shock, etc., and emphasized the defensive aspects as well as the offensive opportunities in this field of applied medical science. The enclosed folder, "Interrogation Techniques", was prepared in my Medical Division to provide you with suitable background.

2. During the summer of 1949, my predecessor as [redacted] and [redacted] then in I & SS, demonstrated in [redacted] the feasibility of conducting interrogations under induced subconscious isolation. In the fall of 1950, [redacted] and [redacted] a medical doctor now with I & SS, conducted further experiments in the [redacted]. The program is now under the control of an I & SS committee with [redacted] as chairman. [redacted] was a [redacted] who knows some parts of the field, and [redacted] doubtless has some information.

3. I believe that it is to our advantage to develop this activity more aggressively and recommend serious consideration of the following programs:

I. Defense: Responsibility and authority in OSI.

a. Continued collection of intelligence of Russian activities by the Medical Division/OSI and publication of intelligence reports, including Section III in "Interrogation Techniques" folder to a limited audience.

b. Creation of a small review panel of such people as [redacted] of the [redacted], a carefully selected psychiatrist, and perhaps [redacted], Chief, Medical Division, OSI. Waivers of security clearance would have to be used to activate such a panel immediately.

This panel should have access to all material bearing on the subject now available to CIA and that in other agencies of the government to which CIA can open the doors.

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It should prepare a report to include the most likely methods, (drugs, hypnosis, shock, etc., and combination thereof), that the Russians would use against us for breaking will power, changing personality, and so on. Danger to captured CIA agents and captured U. S. uniformed personnel should be covered and remedial actions recommended.

It should serve as an advisory panel, if the members are willing, to Part II below.

II. Offense: Responsibility and authority in either ~~for~~ but serving both. G

a. An "experimental" program to verify or modify the findings of the panel of I.b above. All experimentation would be carried on outside of the continental U.S. It could well include as subjects all defectors before a decision was reached to bring them to this country. The program would be implemented by:

(1). Teams in the field, to include persons qualified in medicine, hypnosis, psychological interrogation, the use of the electroencephalograph, electric shock and the polygraph. The number of teams will be determined by the areas of operational use. The first team should be organized immediately to serve ~~in the~~ OSI is prepared to suggest personnel. G F

(2). Training of personnel for future teams. This can start as soon as adequate organization is provided and recruits are cleared.

(3). The team captain should report regularly the results of the experiments to the Panel (I b above) through the Coordinator (III below). Substantive intelligence would not be included in these reports.

III. Coordinator

An "action man" should be provided to (a) amplify and initiate the program outlined above, and (b) serve as Secretary or possibly as Chairman of the Panel. His responsibility and authority could derive either from the ~~Assistant Director~~, or from the two Assistant Directors having responsibility for I and II above. His job would be to keep things rolling. G

H-8/6  
A For this position I would recommend ~~who~~ who has recently offered his services as Consultant to ~~OSI~~ ~~OSI~~ - I am processing his papers at once, since I believe he can serve OSI in some other capacity in the event that this program is not approved.

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4. The above recommendations have not been brought to the attention of the Chief of I & SS [redacted] nor [redacted] You may want to solicit their comments. [redacted] in the [redacted]

[redacted] is familiar with many of the general implications involved, as is [redacted] and [redacted]

A /s/ [redacted]

[redacted]  
Assistant Director  
Scientific Intelligence

Attachment - 1